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After four decades of rapid economic growth that transformed Japan into
a wealthy country at the world’s technological frontier, the last decade
brought prolonged economic stagnation. Despite the long period of low
growth in Japan, there is still little agreement in the universities or amongst
policymakers about its causes or cures. This collection of essays by leading
scholars from Europe, Japan, and the United States oﬀers a comprehensive
assessment of the economic problems facing Japan. Our analysis naturally
separates into an investigation of challenges both for government policy
and to the private sector. The book is organized around these two areas.
The papers are uniﬁed by their empirical character. All of the papers pres-
ent original data analysis, and several uncover new facts that challenge
conventional wisdom.
Challenges for Government Policy
The ﬁnancial crisis is the most commonly cited cause of the prolonged
slowdown of the Japanese economy. Yet there is still substantial disagree-
ment over whether the worst is over and whether the current ﬁnancial diﬃ-
culties are likely to pose long-run problems. The picture that emerges from
our investigation is frightening.
Magnus Blomström is professor of economics and president of the European Institute of
Japanese Studies, both at the Stockholm School of Economics, and a research associate of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. Jennifer Corbett is head of the Japan Centre, Fac-
ulty of Asian Studies, Australian National University. Fumio Hayashi is professor of eco-
nomics at the University of Tokyo and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. Anil Kashyap is the Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and
Finance at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, and a research associate
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.In the opening essay, Mitsuhiro Fukao assesses the current size of the
losses for the insurance companies and banks. Fukao shows that the struc-
tural problems in the banking sector are deep. The banks have not made a
proﬁt from operations since 1993, and the loan losses continue to accumu-
late, even though the banks have already written oﬀ ¥82 trillion (over 16
percent of the gross domestic product [GDP] through March 2002). He
highlights two key problems that underlie the banks inability to make prof-
its. The ﬁrst is deﬂation that limits their ability to raise interest rates with-
out crippling their borrowers. The second is the operations of government
subsidized ﬁnancial agencies that often undercut the banks’ pricing power.
He argues that until both of these conditions are reversed the banks will
continue to hemorrhage.
Fukao argues that the insurance companies’ problems are slightly
diﬀerent. They have primarily suﬀered because of overly optimistic prom-
ises about how much they would pay to policyholders. Due to deﬂation,
they have been unable to earn the requisite return on assets and hence are
losing money on an ongoing basis. It appears that the only way out of this
will be a renegotiation of the promised payments to policyholders.
In the meantime, the insurance companies pose another problem be-
cause of their interconnections with the banks. The banks have large in-
vestments in the insurance companies and the insurers generally are key
shareholders of the banks. This “double-gearing” means that losses from
one sector may spread to the other.
The picture that emerges is grim. Both the banks and insurance compa-
nies are in terrible condition. Fukao estimates that the eﬀective amount of
private sector capital in the banking sector was less than ¥5 trillion at
March 2002 and that a 10 percent decline in stock prices from the level at
that time could wipe out over 75 percent of this capital. Assuming that de-
positors will be paid in full or nearly so, this means that taxpayers are very
close to having to ﬁnance all subsequent losses that are uncovered. There
is a range of private sector estimates that suggest this could easily amount
to another ¥30 trillion.
In the second chapter of the volume, Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshi pro-
vide complementary evidence to Fukao by investigating government-
sponsored ﬁnancial institutions more closely. They focus on the question
of whether these agencies will be able to repay the loans that they have
taken out as part of the ﬁscal investment loan program (FILP). Histori-
cally this program was used to recycle the funds that were deposited in
postal savings accounts. The ﬂows involved are large: More than ¥417 tril-
lion (roughly 82 percent of annual GDP) is being lent out each year.
One of their major contributions is identifying the losses that are ob-
scured by various idiosyncrasies of the typical arrangements. They high-
light three major features of the system that make the losses much larger
than a casual inspection of the agencies’ ﬁnancial statements might sug-
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to allow the agency to book proﬁts. For these agencies if assets were writ-
ten down to realistic levels they would be insolvent. A second problem is
that some agencies have loan losses that they acknowledge exceed their re-
serves. This is further exacerbated because almost all agencies show very
low levels of provisions, so that even small corrections exhaust the reserves.
Finally, on a ﬂow basis, most agencies are shown making small proﬁts rel-
ative to assets, but the proﬁts often disappear once central government
subsidies are taken into account.
Doi and Hoshi suggest conservative estimates indicate that this kind of
game playing already is covering up at least ¥35 trillion in losses (over 7
percent of GDP). But these ﬁgures take the quality of investments made by
the agencies at face value. With reasonable estimates about further undis-
covered loan losses, their estimates would be substantially higher.
Doi and Hoshi also explore the losses that are associated with the lend-
ing by various government agencies to local governments. These calcula-
tions are necessarily more tentative since there are no reliable ﬁnancial
statements for most of the governments, but many of these governments
are not running surpluses that are nearly large enough to repay the bor-
rowing that they have undertaken. Projecting current surpluses ahead,
their baseline estimates suggest that roughly ¥90 trillion is owed by gov-
ernments that are likely to have payment problems unless they signiﬁcantly
increase taxes or cut spending. Although this ﬁgure varies depending on
the exact details of the assumed tax and spending patterns, they consis-
tently ﬁnd that similarly large amounts of lending are at risk for default or
partial default. Their baseline estimate implies that another ¥40 trillion is
likely to be lost on these loans.
Collectively these estimates imply that FILP loan losses could be ex-
pected to cost taxpayers roughly at least ¥75 trillion (15 percent of current
GDP). Together with the losses already identiﬁed by Fukao in chapter 1 for
the private commercial banks and the likelihood of impending future
losses, the Japanese ﬁnancial crisis is well on the way to being huge in terms
of percent of GDP and unprecedented in terms of the absolute size of the
losses.
This naturally leads to the question of where government ﬁnances are
headed in Japan, the topic of Robert Dekle’s study (chapter 3). The dismal
performance of the Japanese economy in the 1990s brought about reduced
tax revenue and increased spending by the government in its attempt to
stimulate the economy. As a result, by 2000, Japan had the largest public
debt-to-GDP ratio among the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) member countries. (The oﬃcial ﬁgures cover
the gross amount of debt issued, and thus ignore the fact that some of the
debt was used to purchase assets. However, even once the netting is done,
the implied levels are high and rising.) The aging of the population will
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percent of the Japanese population will be older than 65—the current pro-
portion is about 15 percent. This demographic shift will lead to soaring
health care expenses and social security payments.
Dekle shows that cost of these payments will require a massive adjust-
ment by the government. His baseline simulation suggests that if current
levels of per capita spending are maintained, taxes as a percentage of GDP
will have to rise from the current level of 28 percent of GDP to nearly 50
percent by 2040. While this calculation turns on a number of details, the in-
escapable conclusion of Dekle’s chapter is that a huge change in budget
policy—either an exorbitant level of taxes or a draconian reform of the so-
cial security and health care system—is needed for the Japanese govern-
ment to remain solvent.
As with the mismeasurement of the size of the public debt, there are con-
cerns that other areas of government statistics do not accurately reﬂect the
seriousness of Japan’s current problems. In chapter 4, Kenn Ariga and
Kenji Matsui investigate the quality of government statistics. Japanese sta-
tistics have been heavily criticized for inaccuracy and sometimes cited as
contributing to poor decision making. Ariga and Matsui argue that the re-
liability of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) could be signiﬁcantly improved
by the simple expedients of increasing the size of the staﬀ working on the
index, raising their professional qualiﬁcations, and expanding data collec-
tion eﬀorts.
Mismeasurement in CPI numbers is obviously important because it
leads to an underassessment of the degree of deﬂation. Ariga and Matsui
estimate that the CPI overstates inﬂation by at least 0.5 percent per year.
This makes failure to halt deﬂation even more costly than conventional es-
timates suggest. Furthermore it has ramiﬁcations for the debate on inﬂa-
tion targeting, where the possibility of eﬀective targeting depends crucially
on timely and accurate measurement of inﬂation, it also aﬀects estimates
of GDP since the same retail price data is used in construction of both CPI
and GDP. Less obviously, the potential costs of mismeasurement are not
limited to policy, but also impact private decision making as well. Finan-
cial and consulting sector economists are concerned over noisy and incon-
sistent data, and frequent, large revisions in data can cause visible swings
in ﬁnancial markets. Chapter 4 concentrates in detail on an investigation
of the CPI. However, as the authors point out, the CPI exhibits three of
the main problems evident in other heavily criticized statistics: (a) long
delays in updating, (b) little interagency coordination in production, and
(c) poor documentation.
Changes in consumer behavior are one source of CPI errors identiﬁed by
Ariga and Matsui. David Flath discusses a related issue, the role of the dis-
tribution system, in chapter 5. The service sector in Japan is notorious
for its alleged ineﬃciency. The method by which goods are distributed is
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consider these patterns traceable to ill-conceived regulation (such as those
that limit the location of large stores).
Simple statistical comparisons conﬁrm that fact that Japan is unusual.
For instance, Japan has nearly twice as many stores per inhabitant as the
United States and 50 percent more of the workforce in the wholesale sec-
tor of the economy, even though the percentage of the workforce in the re-
tail sector is similar. Flath argues, however, that the leap to conclude that
Japanese regulation is responsible for these patterns is unwarranted. He
shows that distribution patterns across countries (as well as between pre-
fectures in Japan) are well explained by fundamental economic factors,
such as the prevalence of car ownership and the average size of homes.
Because private car ownership in Japan has been low until recently and
houses are small and lack storage space, Japan is a country where trans-
porting and storing goods is not easy for households. Thus, the distribu-
tion sector in Japan has been arranged to help with these functions. This
may change in the future, as car ownership and suburbanization becomes
more common. This chapter draws attention to the fact that not all Japan’s
problems should be attributed to the public sector. We therefore turn to a
consideration of several aspects of private sector behavior.
Challenges to the Private Sector
The second part of the book examines the condition of the private sec-
tor of Japan’s economy. The valuation of the corporate sector (as reﬂected
in the stock market) is substantially lower than it was through most of the
last decade. The issue here is whether there are systemic problems with the
way that Japanese corporations and factor markets operate that leave them
ill-suited for recovery.
In chapter 6, Albert Ando, Dimitrios Christelis, and Tsutomu Miyagawa
study the question of whether Japanese corporations have overinvested and
hence are suﬀering from a glut of excess capacity. Interpreting the data is
diﬃcult and Ando, Christelis, and Miyagawa approach the question from a
number of diﬀerent angles. They observe that inconsistencies in valuations
derived from diﬀerent parts of the National Accounts can only be ex-
plained if, in fact, the corporate sector has built up a capital stock that is far
larger than warranted by the proﬁt-maximization motive. As a result, the
rate of return on capital is extremely low. They argue that eﬃcient resource
allocation will not occur until this pattern is broken by forcing the corpo-
rate sector to pay out more proﬁts via dividends to the household sector.
They are not optimistic, however, that this is likely to occur any time soon.
In chapter 7, Lee Branstetter and Yoshiaki Nakamura review the data on
research and development (R&D) over two decades, since R&D is one of
the main drivers of productivity improvements and thus long-term growth.
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1980s there is a sharp increase in the productivity of R&D, but by 1990 pro-
ductivity had reached a plateau and grew little thereafter. Thus, after a
decade of convergence between Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms, innovation trends
diverged sharply in the 1990s.
Interestingly, within Japan, electronics ﬁrms’ research productivity has
held up, while other ﬁrms have fared much more poorly. In explaining this
pattern, the authors note that because Japanese ﬁrms have reached the
technology frontier, they have had to reorient their eﬀorts from the appli-
cation of existing technologies to the creation of fundamental break-
throughs. Branstetter and Nakamura postulate that the shortage of Ph.D.-
level engineers, the weakness of academic science, the lack of commercial
focus in large, centralized corporate labs, and the absence of a venture cap-
ital industry to support start-ups may have created speciﬁc diﬃculties for
Japanese ﬁrms.
The authors’ interviews conﬁrm that ﬁrms are in the process of restruc-
turing their R&D operations to correct these problems and that technol-
ogy alliances with foreign ﬁrms are a preferred strategy. They also note
some public policy reforms which are addressing the productivity problem,
including strengthening the Japanese patent system, increasing public ex-
penditures on research, expanding graduate education, and removing
some legal and regulatory barriers to the expansion of venture capital.
Hiroshi Ono and Marcus Rebick follow and probe labor market distor-
tions in chapter 8. Some analysts have identiﬁed the long-term aging of the
population as foreshadowing a labor shortage. Ono and Rebick examine a
number of personnel practices, laws, and regulations that lower the supply
of labor in the Japanese economy. They focus on two kinds of impedi-
ments: those that restrict the movement of labor between ﬁrms and those
that discourage women from participating to a greater extent. Using other
OECD countries, especially the United States, as a benchmark, they esti-
mate that removal of these barriers would increase the productive labor
supply in Japan by some 13 to 18 percent. An increase of this magnitude
could raise growth nearly one percent per year for a decade.
Ono and Rebick outline numerous structural impediments that inhibit
the mobility of workers between ﬁrms, including strong employment pro-
tection, pension portability, and the so-called age-limit problem, in which
employers refuse to hire persons over the age of forty. Their analysis un-
covers a number of social conventions that explain why these personnel
practices persist and why their removal is not as easy as some Westerners
may think. For example, imposing age limits in hiring remains the number
one problem inhibiting the mobility of workers. But the practice is deeply
rooted in the Japanese system of seniority, and its ensuing egalitarian pay
norms are such that abolishing the practice disrupts the status quo of the
current employment system.
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and is often viewed as a viable solution to overcome the foreseeable labor
shortage problem, but numerous barriers stand in the way. Ono and Rebick
present a list of barriers, such as women’s exclusion from the internal labor
market, problems in the existing tax and beneﬁt structures, and lack of
family-friendly policies. These problems stem from the gender presump-
tions regarding division of labor in which men are responsible for market
activities and women are responsible for nonmarket activities. A typical ex-
ample of this is shown by the current tax system that was originally in-
tended to foster the greater employment of married women by exempting
their income from taxes up to a certain level. The problem is that married
women can actually be penalized for providing too much labor if they ex-
ceed this level. As it stands, such distortions in the household budget un-
dermine the incentives for Japanese women to work.
The ﬁnal question in this book is whether the structure of competition in
Japan impedes growth. It is often alleged that Japanese corporate groups
distort incentives in a variety of ways. Yishay Yafeh analyzes this claim in
chapter 9. In doing so, he provides a deﬁnitive survey of the role of business
groups in Japan. His ﬁrst important observation is that, while a long list of
explanations for group activity have been oﬀered, there is relatively little
consistent empirical support for most of the conjectures.
Yafeh compares Japanese business groups to those in other countries.
The Japanese groups stand out in several respects. First, Japanese groups,
in contrast to the groups in most other countries, lack a centralized deci-
sion-making mechanism. Second, the pattern of proﬁts is somewhat un-
usual. Japanese group members tend to have both lower average proﬁt
rates and lower proﬁt volatility. This pattern is not present in many other
countries. Third, Japanese groups seem to lack signiﬁcant political clout.
But in most other dimensions (average ﬁrm size of members, distribution
across industries, and overall prevalence in the economy), Japanese busi-
ness groups are similar to those found elsewhere.
Yafeh ﬁnds no evidence that the group-dominated industries in Japan
have evolved any diﬀerently from their counterparts in the United States.
This observation, along with the fact that the group ﬁnancial ties seem to
have weakened recently, suggests that the presence of groups is not likely
to be a factor in the capacity for growth in the future.
In summation, these papers suggest that Japan faces a number of chal-
lenges. One message is that ﬁxing the ﬁnancial system cannot be achieved
simply by recapitalizing the commercial banks. Structural problems that
prevent the banks from earning normal proﬁts and risky strategies that
create fragile linkages between banks and insurance companies must also
be addressed. Another message is the need to better understand the invest-
ment behavior of the corporate sector. A system that encourages and per-
petuates overinvestment by ﬁrms also penalizes consumers, creates incen-
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third problem will be ﬁguring out how to pay for the restructuring needed
in light of the growing ﬁscal problems. To add to these diﬃculties, inade-
quate and obscure statistical information makes it more diﬃcult to grasp
and tackle the depth of the problem.
At the same time there is some good news. The corporate groups that are
often argued to be a serious impediment do not seem to be such a problem
looking ahead. Labor market reforms, if properly structured, could gener-
ate a signiﬁcant increase in labor supply. And R&D policies appear to be
shifting in response to a recognized problem.
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